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Was George Orwell a Metaphysical Realist?
Peter van Inwagen
The University of Notre Dame/Notre Dame, Indiana (USA)
Résumé : Le coeur de la nouvelle de George Orwell, 1984, est le débat entre
Winston Smith et O’Brien dans les cellules du Ministère de l’Amour. Il est
naturel de lire ce débat comme un débat entre un réaliste (concernant la nature
de la vérité) et un anti-réaliste. Je présente quelques passages représentatifs
du livre qui démontrent, je crois, que si ce n’est pas la seule manière possible
de comprendre le débat, c’est une manière très naturelle de le faire.
Abstract: The core of George Orwell’s novel 1984 is the debate between
Winston Smith and O’Brien in the cells of the Ministry of Love. It is natural
to read this debate as a debate between a realist (as regards the nature of truth)
and an anti-realist. I offer a few representative passages from the book that
demonstrate, I believe, that if this is not the only possible way to understand
the debate, it is one very natural way.
The core of George Orwell’s novel 1984 is a debate—if the verbal
and intellectual component of an extended episode of brainwashing can
properly be said to constitute a debate—, the debate between Winston
Smith and O’Brien in the cells of the Ministry of Love. It is natural to
read this debate as a debate between a realist (as regards the nature of
truth) and an anti-realist. I offer a few representative passages from the
book that demonstrate, I believe, that if this is not the only possible way
to understand the debate, it is one very natural way. I begin with some
thoughts that passed through Winston’s mind as he was writing in his
diary long before his arrest:
. . . the very notion of external reality was tacitly denied by
[the Party’s] philosophy. . . . His heart sank as he thought
of . . . the ease with which any Party intellectual would over-
throw him in debate, the subtle arguments which he would
not be able to understand, much less answer. And yet he
Philosophia Scientiæ, 12 (1), 2008, 161–185.
162 Peter van Inwagen
was in the right! They were wrong and he was right! The
obvious, the silly, and the true had got to be defended. Tru-
isms are true, hold on to that! The solid world exists, its
laws do not change. Stones are hard, water is wet, objects
unsupported fall toward the earth’s centre. With the feeling
that . . . he was setting forth an important axiom, Winston
wrote:
Freedom is the freedom to say that two plus two make four.
If that is granted, all else follows.1
Let us now look at the debate. Here is an exchange between O’Brien
and Winston.
“Is it your opinion, Winston, that the past has real existence?
. . . You are no metaphysician, Winston . . . Until this moment
you had never considered what is meant by existence. I will
put it more precisely. Does the past exist concretely in space?
Is there somewhere or other a place, a world of solid objects,
where the past is still happening?”
“No”
“In records. It is written down.”
“In records. And—?”
“In the mind. In human memories.”
“In memory. Very well, then. We, the Party, con-
trol
all records, and we control all memories. Then we control
the past, do we not?”2
And here is a second exchange:
“But the world itself is only a speck of dust. . . the whole uni-
verse is outside us. Look at the stars! Some of them are a
million light-years away. They are out of our reach for ever.”
“What are the stars ? . . . They are bits of fire a few kilometres
away. We could reach them if we wanted to. Or we could blot
1Part 1, Ch. vii. (Since there are many editions and printings of 1984, I will cite
passages from the book only by part and chapter.) As early as 1939, ten years before
the publication of 1984, in a review of Russell’s Power: A Social Analysis, Orwell
had written, “It is quite possible that we are descending into an age in which two and
two will make five when the Leader says so.” [Orwell 1939, vol. I, 376]
2Part 3, Ch.ii.
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them out. The earth is the centre of the universe. The sun
and stars go round it. . . . For certain purposes, of course, that
is not true. When we navigate the ocean or when we predict
an eclipse, we often find it convenient to assume that the
earth goes round the sun and that the stars are millions upon
millions of kilometres away. But what of it? Do you suppose
it is beyond us to produce a dual system of astronomy? The
stars can be near or distant, according as we need them . . . .”
. . . a faint smile twitched the corners of O’Brien’s mouth as
he looked down at [Winston].
“I told you, Winston,” he said, “that metaphysics is not
your strong point. The word you are trying to think of is
solipsism. But you are mistaken. This is not solipsism. Col-
lective solipsism, if you like. But that is a different thing; in
fact, the opposite thing . . . .”3
These passages, I think, show that it is natural (which is not to say that
it is right) to read 1984 as a defense of realism. I have myself read the
book this way. (And, of course, as part and parcel of reading it that
way, I regarded Winston as representing the author’s point of view.)
In my book Metaphysics—a book whose intended audience was readers
who came to the book with no clear idea of the meaning of the word
‘metaphysics’—I wrote,
Before we leave the topic of Realism and anti-Realism, how-
ever, I should like to direct the reader’s attention to the
greatest of all attacks on anti-Realism, George Orwell’s novel
1984. Anyone who is interested in Realism and anti-Realism
should be steeped in the message of this book. The reader
is particularly directed to the climax of the novel, the de-
bate between the Realist Winston Smith and the anti-Realist
O’Brien. In the end, there is only one question that can be
addressed to the anti-Realist: How does your position differ
from O’Brien’s? [Van Inwagen 2002,84–85]
There is one thing about this passage that I must apologize for. When
I posed the question “How does your position differ from O’Brien’s?,” I
thought (I must confess this) that no answer to it would be forthcoming—
or no honest answer, no answer that was not a transparent evasion. But
when I re-read 1984 in preparation for writing this paper, I discovered
3Part 3, Ch. iii.
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something that I ought not to have had to discover—something that I
ought to have remembered: that there is an obvious way for the anti-
realist to answer this question. This obvious answer, though I think it
would in the end be an evasion, turns on a very interesting point that
went right past me when I was writing the above passage: that in what-
ever sense O’Brien may be an anti-realist, he is in the same sense a
realist. To see why this is so, let us consider O’Brien’s belief that the
Party invented the airplane. (The Party’s claim to have invented the air-
plane is mentioned repeatedly in 1984 ; Winston thinks of it frequently,
since he can remember very clearly having seen airplanes before the Rev-
olution.) O’Brien believes that the Party invented the airplane because
the Party says it invented the airplane and because all the records of
the past (which are under the Party’s control) say the Party invented
the airplane—as do the memories of everyone whom O’Brien regards as
sane. And this “because” is the “because” of formal, and not of merely
efficient, causation: in O’Brien’s mind, it is a fact that the Party says it
invented the airplane and it is a fact that the Party invented the airplane
and they are the same fact. “The Party says it invented the airplane but
the Party did not invent the airplane” is not, for O’Brien, a thinkable
thought. (That is, it is not a thought he is capable of entertaining. He is,
nevertheless, perfectly capable of understanding what Winston is think-
ing when the thought “The Party says it invented the airplane but the
Party did not invent the airplane” is present in his mind.)
O’Brien, then, certainly appears to accept a form of anti-realism.
After all, solidarity, an appeal to what his peers will let him get away
with, has replaced truth in O’Brien’s conceptual scheme, as it has (so
he claims, and if he says so, I suppose we must believe him) in Richard
Rorty’s—not the same sort of solidarity (or the same peers), I grant, but
a sort of solidarity, nevertheless, and a very well defined class of peers
indeed.
But all this, while it is accurate as far as it goes, is not a complete
account of what O’Brien believes about truth, for he also believes in
objective truth, just as Winston does, and he believes in it in the same
sense. Just as Winston believes that the pre-Revolutionary existence
of airplanes is something that is, so to speak, sitting there in the past,
so O’Brien believes that the Party’s post-Revolutionary invention of the
airplane is sitting there in the slightly-less-recent past. He believes that
the Party is an infallible reporter of a truth that exists independently of
it and all its decrees. (After all, is its propaganda ministry not called
the Ministry of Truth?) The Central Committee of the Soviet Commu-
nist Party called its official organ Pravda, and the Committee did not
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mean that title to be understood as implying that the paper published
a truth created in its editorial offices; they meant it to be understood as
stating, emblematically, that the statements and descriptions that were
published in its pages were the objective truth (unlike what was to be
found in capitalist or fascist or Trotskyist papers). And what was true
under Soviet Communism was true under English Socialism: an Ingsoc
goodthinker like O’Brien must believe in objective truth; how can there
be no such thing as objective truth when the Party claims to be an
infallible (and the only reliable) source of it?
How is O’Brien’s belief in objective truth to be reconciled with his
anti-realism? If by ‘reconcile’ is meant ‘demonstrate the logical consis-
tency of’, it isn’t. If by ‘reconcile’ is meant ‘be able to hold both propo-
sitions in one’s mind simultaneously and without intellectual discomfort’
the answer is doublethink—“The power of holding two contradictory be-
liefs in one’s mind simultaneously, and accepting both of them.” (Why
do O’Brien and the rest of the Party’s inner circle retain their allegiance
to the existence of objective truth? Why do they not achieve logical
consistency—doublethink requires effort; gratuitously embracing contra-
dictions is a waste of effort—by simply eliminating the idea of truth and
replacing it with English-socialist solidarity? This is a very interesting
question; I will return to it.)
I now see (I am finally getting to the end of my parenthetical confes-
sion) that I made a tactical mistake when I confronted the anti-realist
with the question “How does your position differ from O’Brien’s?”. This
was a mistake because the anti-realist has an obvious answer to my ques-
tion that obscures the real difficulty it was meant to raise—that answer
being, “O’Brien believes in objective truth, in a kind of truth that’s inde-
pendent of what our peers will let us get away with—and I don’t.” The
question I ought to have asked is, How does your position differ from the
position that would be O’Brien’s if one, as it were, subtracted from his
actual position the thesis that there is a status, truth, that beliefs can
have that is logically independent of the Party’s approval of them. That
question allows no such evasion.
Enough of my apologetical digression. Let us return to the question
of Orwell and metaphysical realism. If I did not say, in the passage I
have quoted (which is the only thing I have even written that pertains to
Orwell and realism), that Orwell was a metaphysical realist, I certainly
strongly suggested that I regarded him as one, and I will now explic-
itly say that I do regard Orwell as a metaphysical realist. In a much
more nuanced way, Richard Rorty has also drawn a connection between
Orwell and realism4. At any rate, Rorty does not approve of the vocab-
4In “The Last Intellectual in Europe: Orwell on Cruelty,” [Rorty 1989, ch. 8,
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ulary that Orwell uses when he defends what he, Orwell, calls “objective
truth”—that phrase itself being one of Rorty’s least favorite items in any-
one’s vocabulary. It is not my purpose in this paper to examine Rorty’s
way of reading 1984—that is, his attempt to rescue what he regards
as valuable in the book (its depiction of a social order dedicated to the
infliction of pain as an end in itself) from its entanglement with Orwell’s
unfortunate conviction that the idea of “objective truth” needed to be
defended and was worth defending. (At one point Rorty compares the
way he approaches 1984 to the way he would, as an atheist, approach
Pilgrim’s Progress—another book he thinks can be read with profit by
those who do not share its presuppositions.) I simply call attention to
the fact that both Rorty and I see some connection between Orwell and
realism.
In a very long essay in the volume Rorty and His Critics [Conant
2000], James Conant has contended that it is wrong to read 1984 as an
attack on anti-realism and wrong to read the debate between O’Brien
and Winston Smith as a debate about the nature of truth5. According
to Conant, Rorty and I are both obsessed with the realism/anti-realism
debate, and our common obsession has led us to ignore the fact that
Orwell’s purposes in defending “objective truth” were political and in
no way philosophical6. Orwell (Conant maintains) had been repelled by
the kind of thought-control that British left-intellectuals of the 1930s
had applied to one another with respect to the history of their time—for
example, with respect to the events of the Spanish Civil War and the
arrests and trials in the Soviet Union during the Yagoda and Yezhov
eras. Orwell’s purpose in writing 1984—Conant tells us—was to de-
pict a society in which this thought-control had been taken to its logical
conclusion. (I will remark that I agree with Conant’s judgment that Or-
169-188].
5I should point out that Conant did not miss the point about O’Brien that I
missed. He is aware that anyone who says that O’Brien is a consistent defender of
anti-realism must ignore several passages in which he seems to presuppose realism.
6I wonder why Conant thinks that I am obsessed with anti-realism. I know of
no evidence of this (other than my interpretation of 1984 ). I don’t know whether
the fact that Rorty’s contribution to the literature on anti-realism comprises many
hundreds of thousands of words should be taken as evidence that he is obsessed with
anti-realism. But if it does, there is certainly no corresponding evidence in my case.
Not counting collections of my essays, I have published four books. One chapter of
one of the four—an introductory textbook—is devoted to anti-realism, and the topic
is not mentioned, even in passing, in the others. I have published about 130 essays,
of which only one [“On Always Being Wrong,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 12
(1987) pp. 95–111] is about anti-realism. The topic is not mentioned in any of the
others—with the possible exception of “The Number of Things,” Philosophical Issues,
Vol. 12: Realism and Relativism, 2002, pp. 176–96.
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well wanted to depict a state in which certain intellectual habits current
among the British intelligentsia at the time of writing were demanded,
on pain of torture and death, of everyone but the Lumpenproletariat.
It is entirely possible that the title 1984 is an allusion to the year of
the novel’s composition—1948.) There is nothing philosophical, nothing
metaphysical in this purpose, Conant says. But because van Inwagen
(a realist) is obsessed with the realism/anti-realism debate, he is led to
read the novel as a defense of a metaphysical thesis—and to see it as
a stick with which he can beat anti-realists. Because Rorty (an anti-
realist) is obsessed with the realism/anti-realism debate, he misreads
Orwell’s purely political use of vocabulary like ‘objective truth’ and ‘the
solid world’ as something that calls for a philosophical response from
anti-realists—not a refutation, of course, but a reading of the novel that
de-emphasizes or re-interprets such phrases and thereby makes what is
valuable in the novel accessible to anti-realists.
I’ll let Rorty defend himself against Conant’s charge. (He
has, in [Rorty 2000].)
Rorty, I may say, wrote a long essay on 1984. My own remarks were con-
fined to a single paragraph (quoted above). I suspect that Conant would
not have mentioned my passing remark about 1984 if it had not suited
his dialectical purposes to have at his disposal a metaphysician whom
he could present to Rorty as his mirror image: “Don’t you see, Rorty?
You and that metaphysician are equally obsessed with realism and your
common obsession makes it impossible for either of you to understand
the novel—and you, Rorty, are the philosopher who claims to offer us
a way of doing philosophy that will free us from our obsessions with
philosophical doctrines!” (Conant’s strategy resembles that of someone
who, in debate with a Marxist, persistently characterizes Marxism as a
religion.) Still, whatever Conant’s motives for mentioning my paragraph
may have been, I want to defend what I said in it.
Conant says that Orwell is not interested in the realism/anti-realism
debate. But what does Conant mean by realism and anti-realism? He has
not neglected this question. Far from it. His answer is both lengthy and
subtle. He lays out eight “realist theses,” and declares that anyone who
accepts even one of them is a realist of some sort. ‘Realism’, according to
Conant, is as much genre-term in philosophy as it is in art or literature.
Realism is not a philosophical doctrine or thesis, but rather a genre to
which certain philosophical doctrines and theses belong. Some among
his eight realist theses are in fact inconsistent with some of the others
(a fact that Conant lays some stress on), and that implies that two
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philosophical doctrines that contradict each other can be equally good
examples of the genre “realism.”
I certainly agree with Conant’s contention that 1984 is not a polemic
against theses like the eight theses that (he says) define the philosoph-
ical genre realism. At any rate, I agree with it as a judgment about
certain words Conant has written, the words that he has used to for-
mulate the eight realist theses. (I agree that if Orwell were had opened
a book that started with words like those, he would have very quickly
proceeded to close it.) I can’t agree with it as a judgment about theses,
however, because there are no such theses. That is to say, the words
Conant has written formulate no theses at all. They are mere words—
although, since they consist of syntactically correct declarative sentences,
they have the appearance of words that express theses. I am sorry if I
have begun to sound like a logical positivist talking about Hegel or Hei-
degger. I do not, like Carnap and Neurath and the rest, have a theory
according to which all philosophy but my own and that of a few like-
minded colleagues is meaningless. Nor do I have a theory according to
which everything that has been said by the practitioners of some major
division of philosophy—metaphysics, for example—is meaningless. I re-
pudiate any general theory that classifies some large part of philosophy
as nonsense, and I shrink from sounding as if I were offering one. Never-
theless, I insist that philosophers do sometimes say meaningless things,
things that (to borrow the words that Wolfgang Pauli applied to a con-
jecture presented by a fellow physicist) are not even false. For example:
“Being is; not-Being is not” (Parmenides); “The world is a progressively
realized community of interpretation” (Royce); “A self is a logical con-
struct out of sense experiences” (Ayer). Since I have no general theory of
meaninglessness in philosophy—since I repudiate the possibility of such
a theory—, if I wish to show that some piece of philosophical text is
meaningless, there is nothing I can do but examine it sentence by sen-
tence (even clause by clause) and try to show that there’s just nothing
there, nothing but words: that in that piece of text there are no theses
and no questions, that what might appear to be theses and questions
are only words.
I cannot go through Conant’s eight “realist” theses sentence by sen-
tence, examining the meaning of each sentence and enquiring as to its
meaning. I will illustrate my point by examining just one piece of text,
his statement of the first of the eight theses:
The thesis that the Thing-in-Itself is a condition of the pos-
sibility of knowledge. All our experiences of the world are of
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appearances, views of it from some particular point of view.
The only sorts of truths we are able to formulate are truths
about the world under some description. But we should not
mistake the limitations of our knowledge, imposed on us by
our finite cognitive capacities, for limitations that are in-
herent in the nature of reality as such. The idea that our
experience is of the world (that appearances are appearances
and not mere illusions)—that is that there is something which
our descriptions are about—presupposes the further idea that
there is a way which is the way the world is in itself. For the
world to be a possible object of knowledge, there must be
such a way that it is, apart from any description of it—a
way the world is when “viewed from nowhere”, that is from
no particular point of view (or, alternatively, from a God’s-
eye point of view). Moreover, though such knowledge of the
world (as it is in itself) is in principle unobtainable for us, we
are able to think what we cannot know: we are able to grasp
in thought that there is such a way the world is, apart from
the conditions under which we know it. It is only by postu-
lating the existence of such a noumenal reality that we render
coherent the supposition that all our apparent knowledge of
reality is indeed knowledge of a genuinely mind-independent
external reality [Conant 2000, 271–272].
These words simply bewilder me. They should bewilder anyone. How
shall I (in Quine’s fine phrase) evoke the appropriate sense of bewil-
derment? I can do nothing to that end but provide a clause-by-clause
commentary on this passage, and I have no time for that. I’ll content
myself with an examination of the clauses comprised in a single sentence
from this passage: “For the world to be a possible object of knowledge,
there must be [a way that the world is in itself], apart from any descrip-
tion of it.”
“For the world to be a possible object of knowledge.” Presumably this
means, “for anything to be a possible object of knowledge” (or “anything
except the contents of the knower’s own mind”?; I don’t know: one’s
mind is certainly a part of “the world”). The modern science of cosmology
treats the physical world—if not “the world”—as a single, unified object
and attempts to gain knowledge of it (something that Kant said couldn’t
be done). But I don’t think that Conant means this phrase to bring
to the reader’s mind the issue of treating the world as a whole as an
object of knowledge. I think that the phrase should be understood as
introducing a general thesis about possible objects of knowledge. Let’s
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pick a particular object—the Arc de Triomphe will do. What does the
following sentence mean?
For the Arc de Triomphe to be a possible object of knowl-
edge, there must be a way that it is in itself, apart from any
description of it.
I suppose that ‘the way the Arc de Triomphe is’ is an oblique way of
referring to the properties (attributes, characteristics, features, qualities,
choose what word you will) of that monument. If so, our task is to
understand this sentence:
For the Arc de Triomphe to be a possible object of knowledge,
there must be properties that it has in itself, apart from any
description of it.
In this sentence, there are two puzzling adverbial phrases: ‘in itself’, and
‘apart from any description of it’. I do not understand these adverbial
phrases. Let’s take them in their turn. What does this mean
The Arc de Triomphe has, in itself, the property of being in
the center of the Place de l’Étoile?
How does saying this differ from saying that the Arc de Triomphe has
(without qualification) the property of being in the center of the Place
de l’Étoile? There are all sorts of adverbs and adverbial phrases that
can meaningfully be used to qualify ‘has’ when its object is a property:
‘apparently’, ‘essentially’, and ‘according to popular belief’, for example,
but ‘in itself’ is not one of them. If something has a property, it is of
course it that has that property—I just said so. The only use of ‘in
itself’ that I know of in the history of philosophy that brings anything
at all to my mind has to do with secondary qualities. Thus: ‘The Arc de
Triomphe is said to be white, but, really, it doesn’t have that property
in itself; whiteness is simply a quality that exists in the minds of its
observers’. I consider that statement to be a boring sophistry, long
exposed. But suppose I’m wrong. Suppose it’s the sober truth. Then
there’s no sense in which the Arc de Triomphe has the property of being
white. It just isn’t white. Things in our minds are white (or perhaps
whiteness is a free-floating quality that exists in our minds but is not a
quality of anything), but the Arc de Triomphe isn’t white, and there’s
an end on’t. But if it isn’t white, it nevertheless has other properties: it
has at least such properties as not being white and being colorless. Does
it have those properties “in itself”? The question makes no sense.
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Let us turn to ‘apart from any description of it’. What
does this sentence mean?
The Arc de Triomphe has, apart from any description of
it, the property of being in the center of the Place de l’Étoile.
An adverb or adverbial phrase is supposed to answer a question of some
sort. In this case, the question, whatever it may be, would pertain
to the Arc de Triomphe’s possession of a certain property. Here is a
straightforward example of an adverbial phrase in this position:
The Arc de Triomphe has, all the guidebooks tell us, the
property of being in the center of the Place de l’Étoile.
In this case, the question the adverbial phrase answers is “According to
whom (does it have that property)?” But what question does ‘apart from
any description of it’ answer? None is apparent. None is apparent be-
cause there is none. The adverbial phrase, although it violates no rule of
syntax, has no semantical connection with the words that surround it. I
might compare this sentence with these two sentences (also syntactically
unobjectionable):
James Conant has, apart from any visits he has made to San
Francisco, the property of being the editor of The Cambridge
Companion to John Dewey
The Earth has, apart from any Serbian traffic regulations,
the property of orbiting the sun.
I suppose I could imagine outré conversational circumstances in which
there would be a point to uttering sentences like these, but, apart from
some vastly improbable context of utterance, they are simply puzzling.
They are puzzling because, owing to the lack of any discoverable connec-
tion between the adverbial phrases ‘apart from any visits he has made
to San Francisco’ and ‘apart from any Serbian traffic regulations’ and
the other parts of the sentences in which they occur, one can discern no
question about Conant’s editorship or the orbit of the earth for them to
supply answers to.
The role of ‘apart from any description of it’ in the sentence ‘The
Arc de Triomphe has, apart from any description of it, the property of
being in the center of the Place de l’Étoile’ is therefore a puzzle. It is, in
fact, a puzzle without a solution. Anyone who thinks that this sentence
means anything is under an illusion. What is the source of this illusion?
Could it be some argument along these lines?
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To say that the Arc de Triomphe has the property of being in
the center of the Place de l’Étoile is to describe it; therefore,
it does not have that property apart from any description of
it. More generally, for no property that we ascribe to any
object does that object have that property apart from any
description of it.
Anyone who finds this argument persuasive will no doubt go on to con-
tend that it is only those properties that are never ascribed to the object
x that x has apart from any description of it. Perhaps, indeed, that per-
son will want to say that ‘apart from any description of it’ means ‘apart
from any possible description of it’, and will go on to say that it is only
those properties of x that are inexpressible in principle, inexpressible in
any possible language, that x has apart from any description of it.
Is the thesis that objects have some their properties apart from any
description of them then the thesis that some properties of each object
are inexpressible in any possible language? That is an interesting thesis.
I have no idea whether it’s true, but, true or not, it does not seem to be
the thesis that Conant means to be putting forth as one example of the
genre realism. That thesis, after all, is supposed to have some connection
with the idea of the thing-in-itself, and the thesis that there are things-
in-themselves is simply not the thesis that things have properties that
cannot be expressed in any language. I have no real understanding of the
words ‘the doctrine of the thing-in-itself’ but I have a certain negative
grasp of the phrase, and that is sufficient for me to be sure that no one
who claims to understand it would say that the thesis that things had
inexpressible properties entailed (much less was identical with) the thesis
that there were things-in-themselves.
To say that the Arc de Triomphe has properties that it is impossible in
principle to ascribe to it (and if that were true, how could anyone possibly
know that it was true?) tells us nothing about what it might mean to
say that it has those (or any) properties ‘apart from any description
of it’—not in any sense that is relevant to understanding the beliefs of
realists, at any rate. It is of course true that ex hypothesi no reference
to any linguistically inexpressible property will figure in any description
any possible speaker applies to the Arc de Triomphe, but, supposing
there to be realists who say that the Arc de Triomphe has those (or any)
properties apart from any description of it, that fact does not tell us
what they mean by ‘apart from any description of it’. What then do
these (perhaps fictional) realists mean by this phrase? The answer is the
obvious one: they don’t mean anything by it. It is just words. “Words,
words, words,” as Hamlet says.
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In the end I have to say that I feel not the slightest temptation to
believe that language like ‘If our experience of the world constitutes
knowledge, then there must be a way the world is in itself, apart from
any description of it’ makes any sense at all. And I feel the same about
most of the sentences that make up Conant’s other “realist” theses. (I
understand bits and pieces of some of them, but the bits I understand
all pertain to two rather special topics, morals and history. I don’t think
that the bits of his eight theses that I understand, taken individually or
taken together, can be said to provide a statement of a general doctrine,
a doctrine that applies to human thought and discourse in general, a
doctrine that could be called “realism full stop” and not simply “realism
concerning X”. I should say, too, that, although I call myself a realist, I
don’t find the bits I understand particularly plausible.)
Nevertheless, I say, I call myself a realist. But what do I mean by
calling myself a realist if I understand almost none of the sentences that
comprise Conant’s characterization of realism—if I suppose, as I do, that
this characterization is without sense? Well, I mean just what I said I
meant in the early bits of the chapter on realism in my bookMetaphysics,
the chapter that ends with my challenge to the anti-realist to say how
his position differs from O’Brien’s. I’ll briefly repeat what I said—but
in different words, and with some additions.
Speakers often make assertive utterances. That is to say, speakers
utter declarative sentences of languages they understand in the standard
or central circumstances for the uttering of declarative sentences. (Some
non-standard or non-central circumstances: a phonetician asks you to
read the written sentence ‘Mary wants to marry a merry man’ aloud;
playing a minor character inMacbeth, you utter the sentence, ‘The queen,
my Lord, is dead’.)
When we make assertive utterances we often say things. When, a
moment ago, I uttered the sentence ‘I call myself a realist’ I thereby said
that I called myself a realist. (But we do not always say things when
we make assertive utterances. When Royce uttered—or inscribed—the
sentence ‘The world is a progressively realized community of interpre-
tation’ he said—or wrote—nothing. If what I have been saying up to
this point is true, philosophers discussing realism and anti-realism often
make assertive utterances without saying anything.)
When we say things, when we say something, what we say is often
true or false. (But not always. Sometimes what we say falls between
the two stools of truth and falsity. If you say that Alfred is tall, and
if Alfred’s height is 181.5 cm, then what you say is neither true nor
false—since Alfred is a borderline case of a tall man.) If I told you this
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morning that I had not come to Nancy directly from the US but rather
from Italy, what I told you is true—since I came to Nancy from Italy
and not directly from the US. If I told you this morning that I came to
Nancy from Latvia, then what I told you was false, since I have never
been in Latvia.
And what is it that I say of a thing someone has said when I say that
it is true (or false)? Let us say that the things people “say” (“assert,” “af-
firm”) are propositions. But the things that people say, actually say, are
only some among the things I am calling propositions, for not everything
that someone can say is something that actually is said. No one—I am
fairly confident of this—has ever said that Richard Rorty has lectured
on anti-realism at San Francisco State University and the College of the
Holy Names of Jesus and Mary on the same day. Nevertheless, that is
something that could be said; that is something that it’s perfectly possi-
ble to assert; that is to say, there is such a proposition as the proposition
that Richard Rorty has lectured on anti-realism at San Francisco State
University and the College of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary on the
same day. I expect it’s a false proposition (if it’s true no doubt someone
has asserted it), but then lots of propositions are false—roughly half of
them, in fact.
Am I then a platonist—a “small-’p’ platonist” at any rate? Well,
yes, but I think everyone is. I don’t see how to avoid being a platonist.
Everyone says things that imply the existence of things like numbers
and possibilities and attributes—and propositions. You have yourself
asserted the existence of propositions if you have ever said, “Some things
are better left unsaid.” Now someone may want to tell me that such
everyday assertions do not commit those who make them to platonism.
This is not the place to enter into a discussion of that issue. I will
say only that if such everyday assertions as “Some things are better left
unsaid” do not commit those who make them to platonism, then neither
does my assertion (in a philosophical lecture, to be sure, but I don’t see
what difference that makes) that some of the things people assert are
true commit me to platonism. If you don’t like platonism, therefore,
you have as much reason to excuse me from allegiance to the doctrine
you don’t like as you have to excuse the utterer of “Some things are
better left unsaid” from allegiance to it. Make nothing of the fact that
I call the things that are true or false (or the things that are better
left unsaid) propositions. That’s only a word. Obviously, if the things
can be referred to as “things that are true or false” or “things that are
better left unsaid,” one is not going to commit oneself to any substantive
philosophical thesis by calling them by any name. “But,” the reply
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comes, “the word ‘proposition’ is loaded with all sorts of metaphysical
baggage.” I doubt that. But if it is true, I hereby unload it: in this
lecture, ‘proposition’ means only ‘thing that is either true or false (or
indeterminate as between truth and falsity)’.
All right. There are all these propositions. Some are true and some
are false. (From now on, I’ll ignore the tertium datur, indeterminacy.)
Are truth and falsity properties of propositions? I would say so, and
I would say that this is a harmless thing to say. If a proposition is a
thing that is true or false, a property is a thing that is true or false of
something. If a proposition is something one can assert, a property is
something one can assert of something. The proposition that Paris is
the capital of France is something that one can assert. “That it is in
France” is something that one can assert of things: it can be asserted
truly of Paris and Nancy and the Arc de Triomphe, and falsely (only
falsely) of Rome and Bergamo and the Arch of Janus. “That it is in
France” is therefore a property, or at least it is what I am calling a
property. And truth and falsity are certainly properties in that sense,
for “that it is true” is something that can be said of propositions—truly
of the proposition that Paris is the capital of France and falsely of the
proposition that Nancy is the capital of France.
What properties are truth and falsity? I would restate the question
this way: can the open sentences ‘x is true’ and ‘x is false’ be given useful
definitions? (If they can, the definitions will in effect be statements of
what it is that we are saying of a thing when we say that it is true or say
that it is false.) I think that the answer to this question is No. Truth
and falsity are indefinable properties of propositions. I say this because I
have a certain view of quantifiers and variables—essentially Quine’s view
of quantifiers and variables. According to this view, the only variables
are nominal variables, variables that occupy nominal positions. If this
is so, then what Dorothy Grover and others have called propositional
quantification (I prefer “quantification into sentential positions”) does
not exist. That is to say, expressions like
∀p∃q(p→ q)
make no sense. If Quine is right about the nature of quantification—
as I suppose him to be—the meaningful sentence that comes closest
to saying the thing this meaningless sentence is trying to say (I hope
you understand that) must contain nominal variables whose range is the
bearers of truth-value (sentences Quine would say; propositions I say)
and a truth-predicate. The meaningful sentence that comes closest to
176 Peter van Inwagen
saying the thing this meaningless sentence is trying to say is this one:
∀x∃y(the conditional with antecedent x and consequent y is true)
Now why is this thesis of Quine’s about the nature of quantification
relevant to the issues we are discussing? Why should it be of interest
to philosophers whose concern is the realism/anti-realism debate? The
answer is not far to seek. If there were such a thing as quantification into
sentential positions, then, every schoolboy knows, it would be possible
to define truth and falsity. Here’s the definition of truth (assuming that
the bearers of truth-value are propositions; let those who say that the
bearers of truth value are sentences modify this definition in such a way
that it exhibits truth as a property of sentences).
x is true =df ∃p(p&x = the proposition that p).
But this definition is not available to anyone who (like Quine and me)
finds no sense in the idea of variables that occupy sentential—or any non-
nominal—positions. The definiens, we say, is a meaningless sentence.
And what do we say is the meaningful sentence that comes closest to
saying the thing this meaningless sentence is trying to say? We say it’s
this sentence
∃y(y is a proposition & y is true & x = y).
And to say that a proposition is true if it is identical with some true
proposition is hardly to provide an adequate definition of truth! It is for
just this reason that I say that no definition of truth is possible. I have,
of course, examined only the sort of definition of truth that is in some
sense a generalization of sentences like ‘The proposition that Paris is the
capital of France is true if and only if Paris is the capital of France’. I
concede that there are other possibilities7 . For present purposes I will
say only that I doubt whether truth can be defined and that I certainly
don’t want to accept any position that depends on the assumption that
truth can be defined.
Truth and falsity, then, are properties, indefinable properties of many
of the things we say and write and of many things that have never
been said or written. (Consider the grammatical sentences of English
that contain twenty or fewer words. The linguists tell us that there are
7For a detailed discussion of issues related to those my brief remarks on this
subject have raised, see my essay “Generalizations of Homophonic Truth-sentences”
in Richard Schantz (ed.) What is Truth?, (Berlin and New York: de Gruyter, 2002),
pp. 205–222.
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about1080 of them, a number comparable to the number of electrons in
the observable universe. Most of these sentences, obviously, have never
been spoken or written and never will be.) Though these properties are
indefinable, we have a perfect grasp of them. That is, we understand
perfectly the predicates that express them. If you understand what
someone is saying when he utters the English sentence, “Some of the
things Dean said about Nixon were true and some weren’t,” then you
understand the predicate ‘. . . is true’. If you understand the predicate
‘. . . is true’, you know what someone speaking English is saying about
something when he says that it’s true. And if you know that, you grasp
the property truth, for the property truth is just that thing that someone
says about something when he says that it’s true. Just as being in the
center of the Place de l’Étoile is a property of the Arc de Triomphe,
truth is a property of the proposition that the Arc de Triomphe is in
the center of the Place de l’Étoile. And in these two statements, ‘is a
property of’ has exactly the same sense.
If truth and falsity are properties of propositions, it seems reasonable
to classify them as relational properties of propositions (at least in the
case in which they are properties of contingent propositions). But I hes-
itate so to classify them because there are problems about how to define
‘relational property’. I do regard the analogy with the accuracy and
inaccuracy of maps as having some power to convince me that truth and
falsity are relational properties. Accuracy and inaccuracy are properties
of maps (among other things). That is, “That it is accurate” and “That
it is inaccurate” are things that you can say about maps. And it seems
that a map that was accurate can become inaccurate (a river changes
its course; the coastlines change because the polar caps are melting) and
that its becoming inaccurate is normally a “mere-Cambridge” change in
the map. Similarly—the analogy suggests—, the proposition that Paris
is the capital of France may one day become false, and if it does, that will
be a mere-Cambridge change in that proposition, a change that is due
entirely to a real change in France and her political structure. If one is
not altogether happy with this way of talking (as I am not), this will be
because one regards oneself as pretty much ignorant in the matter of the
nature of propositions and thus as not in a position to make judgments
about which changes in them are mere-Cambridge changes and which
aren’t. (I know what propositions do but not what they are.)
Nevertheless, one of the things you can say truly about the proposi-
tion that Paris is the capital of France is that it’s a contingent proposition
and another is that it’s a true proposition. And there’s an important
difference between these two things: even God can’t do anything about
178 Peter van Inwagen
the first, and the second is something that even human beings have the
power to change. And, if they wished to change it, they would change it
by altering matters in France and not by somehow working directly on
the proposition—words that are either meaningless or express a meta-
physical impossibility. Whether you describe this difference by saying
that contingency is an intrinsic and truth a relational property of the
proposition that Paris is the capital of France or describe it in some other
way, the difference is there to be described. And this difference from con-
tingency in this way is an important feature of truth. Despite the fact
that no conceptual confusion is involved in the statement that someone
has caused a certain proposition to be true (I remind you that one causes
the proposition that one smokes to be false by stopping smoking, not by
somehow operating directly on the proposition that one smokes), the
truth of many true propositions (and the falsity of many false ones) is
causally independent of any human activity. We may cite the proposition
that Mt Everest is 8849.87 meters high, the proposition that somewhere
on Mars there are the ruins of an advanced civilization that flourished
millions of years ago, and the proposition that the dinosaurs were mam-
mals. The first is true and the second false; the third is one or the other
(unless borderline cases are involved), although I don’t know which. As
to my contention that the first is true independently of all human ac-
tivity, I hope no one is going to tell me that the proposition that Mt
Everest is 8849.87 meters high would not be true if the metric system of
linear measure had never been devised or if Mt Everest had been named
after Colonel Lambton instead of Colonel Everest.
And I hope no one is going to tell me that the height of Mt Everest
is inherently and inescapably a matter of convention—owing to the fact
that geographers have agreed that the height of a mountain is to be
the distance from the center of the earth of its highest point minus the
average distance of the surface of the sea at the latitude of the mountain
from the center of the earth. If anyone does tell me this thing I hope no
one is going to tell me, I shall reply as follows. There is indeed such a
convention. And it does indeed have something to do with what it is that
English-speakers say (and say truly) when they utter the sentence ‘Mt
Everest is 8849.87 meters high’. For that matter, it has something, and
exactly the same thing, to do with what they would say if for some bizarre
reason they uttered the sentence ‘Mt Everest is five meters high’. But
consider the thing that English-speakers in fact say when they utter the
former sentence—and not what they would say when they uttered that
sentence if some possible alternative convention concerning the heights
of mountains were in force. That thing is true, and its truth has every-
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thing to do with the topography of the Earth’s crust and nothing to do
with anything else—and, most emphatically, it has nothing to do with
human beings and their conventions. I call that thing by the name ‘the
proposition that Mt Everest is 8849.87 meters high’. (At any rate, that’s
the name I call it by when I’m speaking to an audience of philosophers.)
If different conventions about the use of ‘height’ were in force, that name
might well be a name for a different proposition. But they aren’t and
it isn’t. And the thing the name in fact names is true no matter what
anyone calls it. And it would be true in any counterfactual circumstance
in which the topography of the Earth’s surface was as it in fact is, even
if that counterfactual circumstance were so remote as not to include the
existence of human beings.
And that’s what I call realism: the thesis there are true propositions—
contingently true propositions—that would be true no matter what hu-
man beings had ever done and even if human beings had never existed.
(And, of course, this point about truth applies, mutatis mutandis, to fal-
sity.) And I expect Orwell would agree with me on that point—although
he might think it a matter of some importance that I should add to what I
have said a clause that said explicitly that a certain class of propositions
belonged to this category, viz. propositions about the past. Although it
is a nice philosophical question what it is for a proposition to be about
the past (see any philosophical debate about divine foreknowledge and
freedom), it is certainly true that there are many, many propositions
that are uncontroversially about the past. For example, that Elizabeth
I died in 1603 or that Trotsky was murdered by an NKVD agent in 1940.
Orwell would say, and I would agree, that any proposition of this sort—
any proposition that is what I have called “uncontroversially about the
past”—is either true or false (unless it is indeterminate; the proposition
about Trotsky’s murder would be neither true nor false if, e.g., Ramón
Mercader’s relation to the NKVD was ambiguous and he could not be
said without qualification to have been an agent of the NKVD or not to
have been an agent of the NKVD). And if it is now true that Elizabeth I
died in 1603, it will continue to be true even if everyone should somehow
come to believe that she died in 1605 or that she was immortal and still
lived or that she had never lived at all.
I do not see how anyone could disagree with me about this, could
dispute either my general thesis or the codicil I have imagined that Orwell
might want to add to it. I do not see how anyone could maintain that
there is no such property as truth, and I do not see how anyone could
maintain that there is such a property but whether something has it is
in every case causally dependent on the actions of human beings. I do
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not see how anyone could think that “Elizabeth I died in 1603” might
have been true in 1955 and have become false at some point in the
tumultuous 1960s. I do not think anyone does disagree with me about
these things. At any rate, I do not think that Conant disagrees with me.
(O’Brien would disagree—but he would also agree. Doublethink makes
that possible.)
Suppose someone—I do not say “Conant,” just “someone”—were to
reply as follows. “Yes, no one would disagree with you about any of
that stuff (or no one but an Ingsoc doublethinker who also agreed with
you). And, yes, those are just the theses Orwell wanted to defend, even
if his vocabulary was not quite the same as yours. But they’re not
metaphysical theses.”
I suppose I’d have to ask that person what he thought a metaphysical
thesis was. Some at least of the theses I have put forward are certainly
not empirical theses. (Small-p platonism, for example.) When I advance
these theses, what I say cannot be refuted by observation or experiment.
They thus have the feature that the logical positivists used as the touch-
stone of metaphysics. They are, moreover, theses about a concept, truth,
that is as general a concept as there could be. If I tell you that every-
thing Professor X says in his new book is true, that will give you no
clue whatever as to what the book is about. Is it about number theory,
epistemology, geology, tax law, the history of public finance in Tuscany
. . . ? The word ‘true’ is like the words ‘and’ and ‘whether’ and ‘is’; it is
what the Oxford philosophers of the fifties called a topic-neutral word.
(If someone blots out all the words in a treatise but the topic-neutral
words, a reader who examines the defaced text will have no way of know-
ing what the subject of the treatise is.) A predicate that is formed from
a topic-neutral adjective like ‘true’ is as general a predicate as a predi-
cate can be. A property that is, like truth, expressed by a predicate of
this sort seems to be at least a good candidate for the office “property
of interest to metaphysicians.”
Does this mean, then, that Orwell was interested in metaphysics?
Well, certainly not as a discipline, not as an area of theoretical enquiry.
But he was interested in and accepted certain theses that I, at any rate,
insist are metaphysical theses, and he thought that what people believed
about these theses was tremendously important—which is not to say that
he would have been at all interested in the arguments metaphysicians
have used to attack or defend them. (If you summarized a page of Rorty
to him, he would very likely have said something along the lines of, “One
has to belong to the intelligentsia to believe things like that: no ordinary
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man could be such a fool.”8) Here is something that Orwell once said
that illustrates how a person with no theoretical interest in metaphysics
can have beliefs about matters that metaphysicians dispute about—and
can find reason to appeal to these beliefs in an essay on politics. This
is from Orwell’s “The Lion and the Unicorn;” his topic is the historical
continuity of England:
What can the England of 1940 have in common with the
England of 1840? But then, what have you in common with
the child of five whose photograph your mother keeps on the
mantelpiece? Nothing, except that you happen to be the
same person [Orwell 1940, 57].
The last sentence presupposes a view of personal identity that has been
disputed by great philosophers. Many metaphysicians would follow Hume
and say that the adult reader of “The Lion and the Unicorn” and the
child of five were simply not identical with one another; a modern, scien-
tific philosopher like Reichenbach who took more or less the Humean line
would say that the adult reader and the child were two distinct tempo-
ral segments of an four-dimensional “space-time worm.” (I am sure that
Orwell knew, in a purely intellectual sort of way, as a matter of obscure
historical fact, that Hume and other philosophers had had various things
to say about personal identity across time, but I don’t suppose that any
thoughts about Hume or philosophy were in his mind when he wrote the
words I have quoted.) Other metaphysicians would agree with Orwell in
his contention that the adult and the child were the same person—but
these metaphysicians fall into several camps and, when they can spare
time from arguing with the Humeans, argue endlessly with one another
about what it is to for a person who exists at one time to be identical
with a person who exists at another time. Orwell would certainly not
have been interested in their interminable debate. (“The subtle argu-
ments which he would not be able to understand, much less answer”?
Despite what some have said, I’m sure he was able to understand them,
insofar as there is anything in them susceptible of being understood. It’s
just that he would have considered it a waste of his time to try to un-
derstand them.) But although he would not have been interested in the
debate, he did in fact accept at least one of the theses the debate was
about.
8I concede that that famous remark (usually misquoted) was actually directed
at a straightforwardly political thesis—that “American troops had been brought to
Europe not to fight the Germans but to crush an English revolution.” [Orwell 1945,
379].
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Or so I say. Other philosophers will insist that none of the theses
that would figure in a four-way dispute about personal identity among
Derek Parfit, Roderick Chisholm, David Lewis, and myself were theses
that Orwell either accepted or rejected or had so much as entertained.
They will say that when Orwell said “you happen to be the same per-
son,” what he was saying was something that the four metaphysicians
were in agreement about. And someone—I do not say “Conant,” just
“someone”—might say the corresponding thing about what Orwell was
saying when he said, “Facts exist independently of us and are more or
less discoverable”: that this statement is something that all the parties to
the realism/anti-realism debate agree on, and that the points on which
they disagree would have been of no interest to Orwell.
Well, perhaps so. All I can say is, if realism is not the thesis that facts
(some facts, at any rate) exist independently of us, I do not know what
realism is. (I take “Facts exist independently of us” to be another way
of saying that truth exists independently of us. In other words, words a
philosopher might use, “Truth is radically non-epistemic.”) And if anti-
realism is not the denial of the thesis that facts exist independently of
us, I do not know what anti-realism is. And if the question whether facts
exist independently of us is not a metaphysical question, I do not know
what a metaphysical question is.
I wish to end with a discussion of a question I raised earlier: Why
does O’Brien retain his allegiance to the existence of objective truth?
Why does he not achieve logical consistency by simply eliminating the
idea of truth and replacing it with Party solidarity? Or, if you like, why
does Orwell not represent O’Brien as achieving logical consistency by
refusing to affirm the existence of objective truth? The answer to both
questions, I believe, lies in this fact: it is not possible consistently to
reject the existence of objective truth. It is indeed possible to deny the
existence of objective truth—I’ve seen it done—, but it is not possible
not to affirm the existence of objective truth. And, therefore, anyone
who denies the existence of objective truth will also affirm its existence.
And why do I say that it is not possible not to affirm the existence of
objective truth? Because, I say, it is not possible to go through life
without asserting things, and everyone who asserts anything thereby
affirms the existence of objective truth. Consider this sentence, which
could certainly be used to make an assertion:
The Arc de Triomphe is in the center of the Place de l’Étoile.
I’ll call this sentence the “core sentence.” Each of the following four
sentences is a logical consequence of the core sentence:
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It is true that the Arc de Triomphe is in the center of the
Place de l’Étoile
It is objectively true that the Arc de Triomphe is in the cen-
ter of the Place de l’Étoile
The proposition that the Arc de Triomphe is in the center of
the Place de l’Étoile corresponds to reality
The Arc de Triomphe is in the center of the Place de l’Étoile
even if everyone believes that the Arc de Triomphe is some-
where else.
If anyone doubts whether the second of these sentences is a logical con-
sequence of the core sentence, I would ask him whether he thinks that
there is or could be something that is true but not objectively true—and
I hope that if he says there is, he will provide me with an example. To
explain the distinction between “true” and “objectively true” is a prob-
lem for rhetoric or pragmatics, not for logic or semantics. (If anyone
is interested in discussing Kierkegaard’s “Truth is subjectivity,” I’d be
happy to do so. For the present, I’ll record my conviction that this in-
teresting thesis has nothing to do with the realism/anti-realism debate.)
If anyone doubts whether the third sentences is a logical consequence of
the core sentence, I would ask him how he would define ‘The proposition
that p corresponds to reality’. I would offer him either of two definientia
for this schema: he may choose between ‘The proposition that p is true’
and, simply, ‘p’. If “corresponds to reality” is not be understood in either
of these ways, I don’t know how it is to be understood. As for the fourth
and final sentence, note that
If the Arc de Triomphe is in the center of the Place de l’Étoile,
then the Arc de Triomphe is in the center of the Place de
l’Étoile even if everyone believes that the Arc de Triomphe
is somewhere else
is equivalent to
If the Arc de Triomphe is in the center of the Place de l’Étoile,
then, if everyone believes that the Arc de Triomphe is some-
where else, the Arc de Triomphe is in the center of the Place
de l’Étoile,
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which is an instance of a theorem of sentential logic (If p, then if q then
p). If one asserts something, one commits oneself to the truth of its
logical consequences—or at any rate one does if one knows that they are
logical consequences of what one has asserted. Logical consequences of
the sort I have set out are, I think, sufficiently obvious that if someone
makes an assertion, any assertion whatever, he commits himself to the
truth of that assertion, to the objective truth of that assertion, to that
assertion’s corresponding to reality, and to its being true (and objectively
true and in correspondence with reality) no matter what anyone else may
believe. It is for this reason that even the Party cannot dispense with
the idea of a truth that exists independently of its decrees. The Party
must make assertions (that it invented the airplane; that Oceana is at
war with Eastasia and has always been at war with Eastasia) and cannot
forbid its servants to make assertions (it must insist that they make the
same political assertions it does; and, in any case, it is not possible for
people to conduct the simplest affairs of everyday life without making
assertions). And making assertions commits one to realism: to say that
the Party invented the airplane is to say that it is the objective truth
that the Party invented the airplane and would be the objective truth
even if everyone believed that the Party had not invented the airplane.
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